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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Summary Dismissal Was Improper Given The Genuine Issue Of Material
Fact Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Mr. Zepeda has set out that the District Court ened in summarily dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief because his petition raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the
matter of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to withdraw the Alford1
plea. 2 Mr. Zepeda has argued that counsel's performance was deficient in not acting on Mr.
Zepeda's instruction that a motion to withdraw his plea be made. Mr. Zepeda has further argued
that the failure to move to withdraw the plea is subject to the presumption of prejudice standard
of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984). However, even
if this Court finds that the failure to file a motion to withdraw the plea is not subject to a
presumption of prejudice, prejudice exists in this case because there is a reasonable probability
that a motion to withdraw the plea would have been granted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668,697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984). Appellant's Opening Brief pages 9-14.
The State has responded that Cronic does not apply and that any motion to withdraw the
guilty plea would have been denied. The State asserts that Cronic does not apply because a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not within the basic trial rights accorded criminal defendants.

1

2

North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).

The State has noted that Mr. Zepeda did not offer argument as to the enor in summarily
dismissing the petition on the basis of evidence of material facts not previously presented.
Counsel apologizes for the confusion. Mr. Zepeda intended to argue that the petition should not
have been summarily dismissed because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the
ineffective assistance of counsel as supported by the evidence of the letter from Mr. Card. Mr.
Zepeda did not intend to argue that the letter standing alone was sufficient to prevent summary
dismissal. However, the letter does support the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See
Respondent's Brief at pages 14-16.

The State further asserts that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea would not have been granted
because, according to its reading of the case law, a claim of innocence is not a just reason for
withdrawal of an Alford plea. Respondent's Brief at pages 7-14.

I. A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Exists Precluding Summary
Dismissal Because The Cronic Presumption of Prejudice Applies
The State's Cronic analysis is contrary to the state and federal constitutional rights
guaranteeing the assistance of counsel and due process, and therefore must be rejected. Idaho
Const. Art. I,§ 13; United States Const. Amends. 5, 6, and 14.
As set out in Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551 (2004), certain decisions,
including the decision of whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or
take an appeal are of such moment that the defendant has the ultimate authority. "Concerning
those decisions, an attorney must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the
recommended course of action." 543 U.S. at 185, 125 S.Ct. at 560. "[A guilty] plea is not
simply a strategic choice; it is itself a conviction, and the high stakes for the defendant require the
utmost solicitude. Accordingly, counsel lacks authority to consent to a guilty plea on a client's
behalf." Id (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A concession of guilt, with certain very narrow exceptions, cannot be made without the
consent of the client. "It is deficient performance for an attorney to concede his client's guilt
without prior consultation with the client, even where the concession relates to one charge out of
several, and even where evidence of guilt is strong." United States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053,
1059 (2005)(B. Fletcher, concurring).
If that concession of guilt is entry of a guilty plea, or the equivalent of an entry of a guilty

2

plea, without consent of the client, prejudice is presumed. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.l, 7-8, 86
S.Ct. 1245, 1248-9 (1966). In a concession of guilt, there has been a complete failure to function
as the client's advocate and prejudice is presumed. Cronic, supra; Nixon, supra; Thomas, supra.
United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (1991), is illustrative. In that case, in closing
argument, defense counsel told the jury that no reasonable doubt existed regarding the only
factual issues in dispute. The Ninth Circuit found that this was denial of effective representation
justifying a presumption of prejudice per Cronic. In making this finding, the Court noted that
counsel's concession that there was no reasonable doubt implicated not only the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, but also the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the Court noted that in
arguing that there could be no doubt about the facts of the case, defense counsel affim1atively
aided the prosecutor thereby creating a conflict of interest. The Court stated that "An effective
attorney 'must play the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court."'
Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075, (quoting Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,624 (10 th Cir. 1988), in
tum quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 835 (1985).
A defense attorney who abandons this duty ofloyalty to his client and effectively
joins the state in an effort to obtain a conviction or death sentence suffers from an
obvious conflict of interest. Such an attorney, like unwanted counsel,
"'represents' the defendant only though a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction."
Faretta v. Cal{fornia, 422 U.S. 806,821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534 (1975). In fact, an
attorney who is burdened by a conflict between his client's interests and his own
sympathies to the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an attorney
with loyalty to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the
defendant are necessarily in opposition.
Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075, quoting Osborn, 861 F.2d at 629.
In Osborn, as in Mr. Zepeda's case, the abandonment took the form of, among other acts,
,.,
_)

refusing to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. When Mr. Osborn asked counsel to file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, counsel refused and made public statements indicating that
Mr. Osborn had no basis for withdrawing his plea. 861 F.2d at 628. " ... a true advocate would
have attempted to convince the state to allow Osborn to withdraw his plea before sentencing."
861 F.2d at 629. The Osborn court granted habeas relief to Mr. Osborn applying a Cronic
presumption of prejudice. See 861 F.2d at 629 quoting Cronic and stating, "We base our
conclusion that Osborn did not receive effective assistance of counsel on the clear evidence that
the process by which he pled and was sentenced to death was not adversarial, and therefore was
unreliable." In addition, the Osborn Court noted that even if a showing of prejudice was
required, prejudice was demonstrated in Osborn's case because if counsel had been an effective
advocate there was a reasonable probability that the guilty plea might not have been accepted or
that the death penalty be imposed. 861 F.2d at 630.
As stated by Justice Blackman, "Except in the rarest of cases, attorneys who 'adopt the
role of the judge or jury to determine the facts,' pose a danger of depriving their clients of the
zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment." Nix v. Whitside, 475 U.S. 157,
188, 106 S.Ct. 988, 1005 (1986)(Blackman, J., concurring injudgment)(quoting United States ex

re. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3 rd Cir. 1977)( citation omitted)).
In this case, defense counsel adopted the role of the judge when he refused to file a
motion to withdraw Mr. Zepeda's guilty plea. In that act, he abandoned Mr. Zepeda. As in

Osborn, the Cronic presumption of prejudice should be applied. Applying Cronic, the order
summarily dismissing Mr. Zepeda's petition for post-conviction relief should be vacated because
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective.
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2. In The Alternative, Appfying The Strickland Prejudice
Requirement, A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists Precluding
Swnmmy Dismissal

Even if this Court finds that Cronic does not apply, summary dismissal was inappropriate
in this case because the petition did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel
was ineffective in refusing Mr. Zepeda's request for a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The District Court applied Strickland and held that summary dismissal was appropriate
because Mr. Zepeda had not presented evidence to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard. The District Court held that State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 486,
861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993), applies and that under Dopp, Mr. Zepeda needed to provide more
substantial reasons that just asserting legal innocence to support a motion to withdraw the plea.
This holding indicates that the Court accepted Mr. Zepeda' s uncontroverted assertion that he had
requested the motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. Otherwise, the Court would
have held that Mr. Zepeda needed to establish a manifest injustice to allow withdrawal of the
plea. See ICR 33( c).
The application of Dopp is consistent with the facts before the District Court. Mr.
Zepeda repeatedly asserted that he had requested a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to
sentencing:
... I asked to withdraw my plea because I still wanted to go to trial. He said that I
could not [do] that. But I found out that I.C.R. 33( c) states that I could have
withdrawn my plea before sentence was imposed. Petition and Affidavit for Post
Conviction Relief, R 4 .
. . . I asked him to withdraw my plea because I wanted to go to trial. He said I was
not allowed to withdraw but I.C.R. 33(c) clearly states that 1 could in fact have
withdrawn my plea before sentence was imposed so it clearly shows that the
attorney was ineffective as counsel. ... And where I entered a plea of guilty but
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conditioned such a plea with a statement to the effect that I did not admit the facts
of the charge and prior to sentencing I moved to withdraw the plea and according
to the attorney the court would not grant such a motion .... Affidavit of Facts in
Support of Post-Conviction, R 8.
Mr. Zepeda supported his allegations with a letter from counsel. In the letter, counsel
refers to a letter sent to him by Mr. Zepeda on January 6, 2010, asking about the withdrawal of
the plea. Counsel responds by noting the receipt of the letter and states, "In spite of it all, you
still wanted to enter a voluntary plea. On what basis is it not a voluntary plea?" R 56. Counsel's
letter does not state that Mr. Zepeda's letter of January 6,2010, was the first mention of the
desire to withdraw the plea. And, the tone of counsel's response, demanding to know on what
basis the plea was involuntary and not stating anything about the request being first made postsentencing or referencing the manifest injustice standard indicates, as the District Court also
concluded, that the request was first made prior to sentencing and that the Dopp standard of
something more than a mere assertion of innocence was required.
The State argues on appeal that the District Court was correct in applying Strickland and
Dopp and that in accord with its reading of Dopp, Mr. Zepeda had not presented a genuine issue
of material fact as to the prejudice prong of Strickland because, according to the State, Dopp
holds that an A(ford plea may never be withdrawn based upon a claim of actual innocence where
there is some basis in the record of factual guilt. Respondent's Brief at pages 10-14. This
reading of Dopp is incorrect.
Dopp does not hold that A(ford pleas may never be withdrawn based upon a claim of
actual innocence in cases where there is some basis in the record of factual guilt. Respondent's
Brief at page 10, 13. Dopp holds:

6

Federal cases hold generally that a defendant who enters an Alford-type plea is not
'willy nilly' entitled to withdraw it, as this would render inconsequent the guilty
plea. Application of the two-part test [defendant must show ajust reason for
withdrawing the plea and once this has been done the State may avoid withdrawal
by demonstrating prejudice] influenced by the guidance offered by these recent
federal cases, leads us to the conclusion that where a guilty plea is properly
entered, withdrawal is not an automatic right and more substantial reasons than
just asserting legal innocence must be given.
124 ldaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56.
What Dopp holds is that the two-part test - just reason must be shown and the state may
avoid withdrawal by demonstration of prejudice - applies and that more than "just asserting"
legal innocence is required. Dopp does not hold that an Alford plea may never be withdrawn
when the defendant denies factual guilt.
The "just reason" standard does not require that the defendant establish a constitutional
defect in his or her guilty plea. State v. Ward, 135 ldaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388,392 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2000), citing State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411,413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct.App.1987). A
just reason for withdrawal of a plea can include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly
discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for withdrawing the plea
that did not exist when the defendant entered the plea. United State v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805
(9 th Cir. 2005), considering the analogous Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (d).
In this case, had counsel complied with Mr. Zepeda's request to move to withdraw the
guilty plea, Mr. Zepeda could have presented not only an assertion of legal innocence, but also a
just reason, specifically that in addition to his own assertions of factual innocence, Mr. Zepeda
had obtained the letter from Mr. Card which was extrinsic proof of his factual innocence.
Thus, even if the Strickland two-prong standard for establishing ineffective assistance of
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counsel is applied, the petition did raise a genuine issue of material fact and the order of
summary dismissal must be vacated.

III. CONCLUSION
As set out above and in the Opening Brief, Mr. Zepeda's petition for post-conviction
relief did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to act upon his request to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, Mr. Zepeda asks this Court to reverse the order granting
summary dismissal and the order denying the motion to reconsider and remand for further
proceedings.

ff.

Respectfully submitted this

/9- day of September, 2011.

Deborah Whipp!~
Attorney for Jose Zepeda
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